ABSTRACT High-tech manufacturers frequently suffer from supply risk and capacity constraint. This paper considers a manufacturer who procures a type of high-tech component from two suppliers with asymmetric costs, capacities, and reliabilities, where the low-cost supplier has low reliability. One supplier is selected as a primary supplier and another as a backup supplier. The manufacturer places regular order to the primary supplier and determines backup order quantity from the backup supplier after random yield realization of the primary supplier. By developing a dynamic game-theoretical model, we obtain the optimal wholesale prices for the primary supplier and backup supplier, the optimal order quantity and supplier arrangement decisions for the manufacturer. We show that the manufacturer selects the low-cost supplier as a primary supplier and the high-cost supplier as a backup supplier (namely, LH policy) when the reliabilities of the two suppliers are close. When these reliabilities are not so close, the manufacturer chooses the high-cost supplier as a primary supplier and the low-cost supplier as a backup supplier (namely, HL policy). In addition, the manufacturer in the industry with scale diseconomies is more likely to select HL policy than that in the industry with scale economies. Compared with centralized decision making scheme, decentralized scheme induces the manufacturer more likely to select HL policy in the industry without scale economies, whereas in the industry with scale economies, decentralized scheme induces the manufacturer more likely to choose either HL policy when the capacity advantage of the low-cost supplier is weak, or LH policy when this advantage is significant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Supply risk is the probability of an incident associated with inbound supply from individual supplier failures or the supply market occurring, in which its outcomes result in the inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer demand or cause threats to customer life and safety [1] In high-tech industry, firms frequently suffer from high level of supply risk [2] . This is because the firms require their suppliers to regularly upgrade key components such as the microchip of smartphone and the CPU of computer, etc. To quickly grab market share, the time between development and production The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jinming Wen.
is extremely short. The engineers at supplier side may not be able to exercise sufficient tests for the complex manufacture procedure as well as adequate training for workers. As a result, the suppliers often encounter high failure rate in production for the components, which leads to low production yield and even supply disruption. For example, in 2012, Evonik suffered an explosion during the production for a special resin material, which resulted in supply disruption and caused downstream Ford to delay the launch of the new pickup truck [3] . Besides supply risk, the firms in high-tech industry also frequently face severe upstream capacity constraint [4] , because their suppliers always invest gingerly for the capacity of short life cycle components and the strong customer demand highlight the scarcity of the capacity further.
Meanwhile, there may exist scale diseconomies for the capacity investment in high-tech industry [5] , [6] , which also discourage the suppliers to expand their capacity. For instance, in 2007, because of insufficient capacity and short supply of aircraft fasteners of upstream Alcoa, Boeing had to delay the delivery of the 787 Dreamliner by 6 months, resulting in a loss of nearly $2.5 billion [6] . Similar things happened to Intel and AMD [4] .
When a firm faces upstream supply risk and capacity constraint, dual sourcing becomes an excellent choice [8] .
In terms of the implement of dual sourcing, different from traditional industry firms which usually exercise simultaneous ordering, plenty of firms in high-tech industry prefer to sequential ordering, i.e., placing regular order to one supplier (namely, primary supplier), and placing backup order to another supplier (namely, backup supplier) after primary supplier finishes its production. Compared with simultaneous ordering, the advantages of sequential ordering are clear. First, the sequential ordering can effectively mitigate the supply uncertainty of primary supplier because there is a backup option after the primary supplier's random yield realization. Second, during the production of primary supplier, the backup supplier has sufficient time to prepare raw material, train staff, overhaul equipment and improve process, etc.; as a result, the backup production of the backup supplier is more responsive and more reliable than regular production. Most of existing related studies even suppose that backup production is perfectly reliable (e.g., [7] , [9] - [11] ). There is also a disadvantage for sequential ordering; that is, backup sourcing leads to high procurement cost because the responsive and reliable production of backup supplier is expensive. However, the high value of final products induce the firms in high-tech industry to reduce supply risk actively regardless of the expensive backup cost. For example, in 2015, Samsung and Globalfoundries get the supply contracts of A9 Processor for iPhone 6s, where Samsung is set as primary supplier and Globalfoundries as backup supplier [12] . Similar to Apple, the dual sourcing strategy with one primary supplier and one backup supplier is widely adopted by famous companies such as Nokia, Toyota and Honda [9] , [13] . Motivated by real operation practices, this study investigates the dual sourcing strategy for a manufacturer in the context of supply risk, capacity constraint and backup production.
There is rich literature considering dual/multiple sourcing with sequential ordering. Tomlin (2006) investigates a supply chain with a firm and two capacitated suppliers, where the primary supplier is unreliable and the backup supplier is reliable but more expensive [14] . The firm can mitigate supply risk by carrying inventory or placing backup sourcing. Considering random lead time of the original supplier, Kouvelis and Li (2008) examine the backup sourcing decisions for the buyer [15] . Qi (2013) studies a continuousreview inventory problem for a retailer who has an option to order from the backup supplier when inventory level reaches reorder point and the primary supplier cannot recover from disruption [16] . Considering the random yield of the primary supplier and the backup sourcing option of the buyer, Chen and Yang (2014) examine coordination mechanisms in both buyer-Stackelberg model and supplier-Stackelberg model [10] . Chen and Xiao (2015) investigate the backup sourcing strategy for the buyer and the production planning for the supplier in presence of random demand and random yield [17] . They also analyze the value of backup sourcing for both decentralized and centralized channels. Zeng and Xia (2015) design a revenue-sharing backup contract for a purchasing firm and find that this contract can not only mitigate the supply disruption from the primary supplier but also encourage the backup supplier to reserve capacity for the firm [8] . Merzifonluoglu (2015) considers a newsvendor problem with multiple suppliers. The firm (newsvendor) first determines order quantities from unreliable capacitated primary suppliers. After the realization of customer demand and reliabilities of the primary suppliers, the firm purchases from the backup supplier [11] . Guo et al. (2016) consider a firm that procures a product from a regular supplier whose production is subject to both supply disruption and random yield and a backup supplier whose production capacity requires reservation in advance [18] . Kamalahmadi and Parastb (2017) assess the effectiveness of the policy incorporated by three types of practices, namely, pre-positioning inventory, backup sourcing, and protected suppliers, in presence of supply risk [19] .
Throughout the existing related literature, general wisdom is used to examining sourcing strategies for the manufacturers by exogenously given primary and backup suppliers, and has traditionally ignored the endogenous decisions on supplier arrangement of the manufacturers such as aforementioned Apple, Nokia, Toyota and Honda. Thus, the following research questions are well worth examining. First, in dual sourcing, which supplier should be designated as primary supplier and which one as backup supplier when the two supplies have different costs, reliabilities and capacities? Second, what is the difference of supplier arrangement decisions between the industries with scale economies and scale diseconomies? Finally, what are the impacts of decision making schemes (i.e., centralized and decentralized schemes) on the supplier arrangement decision?
To shed light on the aforementioned research questions, the following model is proposed. We consider a manufacturer who needs to purchase a sort of high-tech component from two suppliers with different costs, capacities and reliabilities, where the low-cost supplier has low reliability. The manufacturer first selects primary supplier and backup supplier. Then the primary supplier determines its unit wholesale price and the manufacturer determines the regular order quantity from this supplier. After the random yield of the primary supplier is realized, the backup supplier determines its unit wholesale price and the manufacturer determines backup order quantity from the backup supplier. The backup production (of the backup supplier) is rapid, perfectly reliable but expensive.
Under centralized decision making scheme, we show that LH policy (i.e., taking the low-cost supplier as primary supplier and the high-cost supplier as backup supplier) is active when the reliabilities between the two suppliers are close. When these reliabilities are not so close, HL policy (i.e., taking the high-cost supplier as primary supplier and the low-cost supplier as backup supplier) is active. The manufacturer in the industry with scale diseconomies is more (less) likely to select HL (LH) policy than that in the industry with scale economies. Similar results appear under decentralized decision making scheme. Nevertheless, compared with centralized scheme, decentralized scheme strengthens the significance of HL policy in the industry without scale economies, whereas in the industry with scale economies, decentralized scheme enhances the significance of either HL policy when the capacity advantage of the low-cost supplier is weaker than its cost advantage, or LH policy when the opposite is the case. In addition, our model is extended to a general case of asymmetric backup production costs between the two supplies. Compared with symmetric backup production costs, the asymmetric backup production costs cause the manufacturer more likely to choose LH (HL) policy when the market potential is small (large) under centralized scheme. Under decentralized scheme, compared with symmetric backup production costs, the asymmetric backup production costs induce the manufacturer in the industry with scale economies more likely to select HL policy; whereas for the manufacturer in the industry without scale economies, the asymmetric backup production costs do not change or affect his decision on supplier arrangement (i.e., HL policy yet), but amplify the advantage of HL policy further. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the supplier arrangement strategy in the framework of backup sourcing with supply risk and capacity constraint
II. BASE MODEL A. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Consider that a manufacturer M needs to purchase a kind of high-tech component and manufacture it into final product to satisfy customer demand. Without loss of generality, we assume that each unit of product requires one unit of component [20] . The inverse demand function of the product is given by p = D − Q [21] where p is the market price, D denotes the market potential (saturation) and Q represents the product quantity put on the market by the manufacturer. The manufacturer has two suppliers L and H, with capacities k L and k H , respectively. The procurement events can be divided into three stages, namely, supplier arrangement stage, regular sourcing stage and backup sourcing stage. In the first stage (supplier arrangement stage), one supplier is selected as primary supplier and another as backup supplier, just like aforementioned Samsung and Globalfoundries. In the second stage (regular sourcing stage), the primary supplier determines its unit wholesale price w r , and the manufacturer determines the regular order quantity Q r . Then the primary supplier implements regular production. Under regular production, for any potential primary supplier i, i ∈ {L, H }, its random yield is δ i , and it incurs a cost c i for each delivered unit. Similar to previous studies (e.g., [8] , [9] , [15] , [16] ), we consider a special random yield: supply disruption, which is quite common in practice. Thus, assume δ i follows (0-1) distribution [22] , i.e., δ i = 1, with probability α i 0, with probability 1 − α i
Like previous studies (e.g., [8] , [9] , [15] , [16] ), we define the probability α i as the reliability of supplier i. We further suppose c L < c H and α L < α H ; that is, the low-cost supplier has low reliability [23] , [24] . Thus, the manufacturer can obtain δ i Q r units of component from regular sourcing.
In the third stage (backup sourcing stage) after the primary supplier finishes its regular production, the random yield of the primary supplier is realized. Based on this realized yield, the backup supplier determines its unit wholesale price w b , and the manufacturer determines the backup order quantity Q b from the backup supplier. The backup production of the backup supplier is rapid, perfectly reliable but expensive (see, [6] , [8] - [10] ), because backup production is behind regular production and the backup supplier has sufficient time to prepare raw material, train staff, overhaul equipment and improve process, etc. Whether the backup supplier is L or H, assume that the unit backup production cost is c b (see, [9] ). The case of asymmetric (different) backup production costs will be discussed in Extension.
This assumption ensures that our study is limited to dual sourcing.
Assumption 2:
. This assumption means that the backup production is costly, and ensures that the manufacturer turns to backup sourcing until the capacity of the primary supplier runs out.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Although the two suppliers have identical backup cost c b , the regular production cost of supplier L is lower than that of supplier H, i.e., c L < c H . Hereafter, for convenience, we refer to supplier L as the low-cost supplier, and supplier H as the high-cost supplier. For the manufacturer, there are two possible supplier arrangement policies: first, the low-cost supplier L is selected as primary supplier and the high-cost supplier H as backup supplier; second, the high-cost supplier H is selected as primary supplier and the low-cost supplier L as backup supplier. For convenience, we refer to the former as LH policy and the latter as HL policy.
Next, we will discuss the sourcing strategies under both centralized and decentralized decision making schemes and analyze the strategic differences between them in Subsections C, D and E B. NOTATION Table 1 summarizes the primary parameters and variables which are used in this paper. 
C. PROCUREMENT DECISIONS UNDER CENTRALIZED SCHEME
Under centralized decision making scheme, suppliers L and H can be regarded as the factories owned by the manufacturer but located in different regions or countries. Thus, the unit wholesale price of each supplier equals its unit cost [25] , [26] .
Through backward induction, we first analyze the backup order decision problem at stage 3. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), regular order quantity Q ri and realized yield δ i of the primary supplier, the manufacturer needs to determine backup order quantity Q bj to maximize his profit from backup sourcing; that is,
The term (D − δ i Q ri − Q bj )Q bj is the revenue of the manufacturer from backup sourcing, and the term c b Q bj is the backup sourcing cost. We next analyze the regular order decision problem at stage 2. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j, the manufacturer needs to determine regular order quantity Q ri to maximize his expected profit; that is,
By solving the aforementioned two programs, Proposition 1 is obtained.
Proposition 1: Under centralized decision making scheme, given that the primary supplier is i and backup supplier is j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), the optimal regular order quantity is Q ri = k i and the optimal backup order quantity is
Proof: Note that (1) is concave in Q bj and its first order
Thus, by combining the constraint condition (2), the optimal solution of (1) is
Substituting (4) into (3) results in
Clearly, the equation above is concave and its FOC solution is Q ri = 2(c b − c i ). According to Assumptions 1 and 2, we have
Proposition 1 shows that the manufacturer always runs out of the primary supplier's capacity (i.e., Q * ri = k i ) before turning to backup sourcing because the backup production is costly. Note that the backup order quantity Q * bj decreases in the realized yield δ i of the primary supplier. However, Q * bj is still positive even δ i = 1. It means that the backup sourcing can mitigate both the supply risk and the capacity constraint from the primary supplier.
Substituting (3), we can obtain the optimal expected profit π C ij of the manufacturer when the primary supplier is i and backup supplier is j (the superscript ''c'' labels the centralized decision making scheme in the base model), i.e.,
Based on (5), we can analyze the supplier arrangement decision problem at stage 1. By comparing π c LH with π c HL , Proposition 2 is obtained.
LH < π c HL , where
LH − π c HL < 0. Proposition 2 means that under centralized decision making scheme, when the reliabilities between the two suppliers are close (α L /α H ≥ λ 1 ), LH policy outperforms HL policy
Recall that supplier L has an advantage in cost, whereas supplier H has an advantage in reliability; that is, c L < c H and α L < α H . When the reliabilities of the two suppliers are close, the reliability advantage of supplier H is not significant, and the cost advantage of supplier L plays a leading role; as a result, the manufacturer selects L as the primary supplier (LH policy). When the reliabilities of the two suppliers are not so close, the reliability advantage of supplier H plays a leading role; thus, the manufacturer selects H as the primary supplier (HL policy).
Note that we do not set the relative sizes between k L and k H in our model. This is because in practice, k L can be either greater or less than k H . Specifically, in the industry with scale economies on capacity investment, the lowcost supplier has high capacity (k L > k H ), whereas in the industry without scale economies on capacity investment, the low-cost supplier has low capacity (k L ≤ k H ). Making further investigation on Proposition 2, it is not difficult to obtain the following properties. In the industry without scale economies (
e., HL policy always outperforms LH policy), and when
, we have λ 1 < 1 (i.e., LH policy outperforms HL policy if α L /α H ≥ λ 1 , and HL policy outperforms LH policy if α L /α H < λ 1 ). However, in the industry with scale economies (k L > k H ), we always have λ 1 < 1. This phenomenon implies that the manufacturer in the industry without scale economies is more likely to select HL policy than that in the industry with scale economies. This is because scale diseconomies 
endow the high-cost supplier H with one more advantage (i.e., the capacity advantage), and then the manufacturer is more inclined to choose H as primary supplier. Figure 2 visualizes the results of Proposition 2.
D. PROCUREMENT DECISIONS UNDER DECENTRALIZED SCHEME
Under decentralized decision making scheme, suppliers L and H can be regarded as the factories not owned by the manufacturer. Thus, both the primary supplier and the backup supplier need to determine wholesale price [27] . Through backward induction, we first analyze the backup order decision of the manufacturer at stage 3. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), unit wholesale price w ri , and realized yield δ i of the primary supplier, regular order quantity Q ri of the manufacturer, and unit wholesale price w bj of the backup supplier, the manufacturer needs to determine backup order quantity Q bj to maximize his profit from backup sourcing; that is,
We next analyze the wholesale price decision of the backup supplier at stage 3. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), unit wholesale price w ri , and realized yield δ i of the primary supplier, and regular order quantity Q ri of the manufacturer, the backup supplier only needs to determine its unit wholesale price w bj to maximize its profit; that is, max w bj
Then we analyze the regular order decision of the manufacturer at stage 2. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), unit wholesale price w ri of the primary supplier, the manufacturer needs to determine the regular order quantity Q ri to maximize his expected profit; that is,
We next analyze the wholesale price decision of the primary supplier at stage 2. Given primary supplier i, backup supplier j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), the primary supplier only needs to determine the wholesale price w ri to maximize its expected profit; that is,
By solving the aforementioned four programs in turn, Proposition 3 is obtained.
Proposition 3: Under decentralized decision making scheme, given that the primary supplier is i and backup supplier is j (i, j ∈ {L, H } and i = j), the optimal unit wholesale price of the primary supplier is derived as follows:
the optimal regular order quantity of the manufacturer is expressed as follows:
the optimal unit wholesale price of the backup supplier is
and the optimal backup order quantity of the manufacturer is
Proof: Note that
that is, (6) is concave in Q bj . Thus, there exists a maximal value for (6). It is not difficult to find that the FOC solution for
, by combining the constraint condition (7), the optimal solution of (6) is
Substituting (16) into (8) results in
Clearly, (17) 
Thus the optimal solution of (17) is
Substituting (18) into (16) results in
Substituting (18) and (19) into (9), we have
Clearly, the equation above is concave in Q ri and its FOC solution is Q ri = (3c b + 5D − 8w ri )/11. By combining the constraint condition (10), the optimal solution of (9) is (20) Substituting (20) into (11) yields
Clearly, (21) is continuous, k i (w ri − c i )α i increases in w ri and (5D + 3c b − 8w ri )(w ri − c i )α i /11 is concave in w ri . The FOC solution of (5D + 3c b − 8w ri )(w ri − c i )α i /11 is w ri = (5D + 3c b + 8c i )/16. According to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, we can find that (5D
Thus, the optimal solution of (21) is
Substituting (22) into (20) results in
Combining (18), (19) , (22) , and (23), we obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 shows that whether the primary supplier is L or H, the wholesale price decision of the primary supplier mainly depends on its own capacity, and has nothing to do with its production cost and reliability. This is because backup sourcing is costly and the manufacturer always runs out of the VOLUME 7, 2019 capacity of the primary supplier regardless of this supplier's production cost and reliability. Thus, the primary supplier charges wholesale price mainly based on its capacity. Note that the reliability of the primary supplier still plays an important role on procurement decisions; that is, it affects backup wholesale price w * b j and backup order quantity Q * bj . However, all of w * ri , Q * ri , w * b j
, and Q * bj are irrelevant to c i . This means that in the high-tech industry with scarce capacity and expensive backup option, the manufacturer pays no attention to the production cost of the primary supplier under decentralized scheme.
Corollary 1: In the case of k L ≤ k H , the unit wholesale price of primary supplier under LH policy is higher than that under HL policy, i.e., w rL ≥ w rH , whereas in the case of k L > k H , the unit wholesale price of primary supplier under LH policy is lower than that under HL policy, i.e., w rL < w rH .
Proof: By (12) we have w rL − w rH
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is clear. In the industry with scale economies, the capacity of supplier H is lower than that of supplier L, i.e., supplier H has scarcer capacity. Recall that the primary supplier's wholesale price mainly depends on its own capacity. Thus, the wholesale price of primary supplier H (in HL policy) is higher than that of primary supplier L (in LH policy). Similarly, in the industry without scale economies (k L ≤ k H ), the wholesale price of the primary supplier under LH policy is higher than that under HL policy.
Substituting (12), (13), (14) , and (15) into (9) results in the optimal expected profit π d ij of the manufacturer when the primary supplier is i and backup supplier is j (the superscript ''d'' labels the decentralized decision making scheme in the base model), i.e.,
By comparing π d LH with π d HL , the optimal supplier arrangement decision is obtained, which is illustrated in Proposition 4.
By (24), we have
Then two scenarios are discussed as follows. 
Recall that the manufacturer pays no attention to the production cost of the primary supplier under decentralized scheme; that is, decentralized scheme causes the cost advantage of L to be inoperative. As a result, the manufacturer only needs to trade off reliability and capacity. Specifically, in the industry with scale economies (k L > k H ), when the reliabilities of the two suppliers are close, the reliability advantage of supplier H is not significant, the capacity advantage of supplier L plays a leading role, and then the manufacturer selects L as the primary supplier (LH policy); when the reliabilities of the two suppliers are not so close, the reliability advantage of supplier H plays a leading role and the manufacturer chooses H as the primary supplier (HL policy). In the industry without scale economies (k L ≤ k H ), supplier H has both reliability and capacity advantages; as a result, the manufacturer always chooses H as the primary supplier (HL policy). The managerial insights are that the manufacturer in the industry without scale economies is more likely to select HL policy than that in the industry with scale economies. Figure 3 
E. COMPARISON BETWEEN CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED SCHEMES
Comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 4, we can find that the difference of supplier arrangement decisions between centralized and decentralized schemes. First, in the industry without scale economies, either LH policy or HL policy can be optimal under centralized decision making scheme, whereas under decentralized scheme, HL policy is always optimal. It means that decentralized scheme strengthens the significance of HL policy. This is because there is a cost advantage for supplier L under centralized scheme, but this advantage doesn't work under decentralized scheme. Second, in the industry with scale economies, it would be intuitive that the result might be the same. Surprisingly, it is not the case. To shed light on the essential, we need to compare λ 1 (which is the threshold illustrated in Proposition 2) with k 2 H /k 2 L (which is the threshold illustrated in Proposition 4).
Proof: Clearly,
By Assumptions 1 and 2, we can find that c b − c H > 0 and 
is the contrast between the regular production costs of the two suppliers by using c b as a reference, and k L /k H denotes the contrast between the capacities of the two suppliers. Thus, Corollary 2 means that in the industry with scale economies (k L > k H ), compared with centralized decision making scheme, decentralized scheme either enhances (diminishes) the significance of HL (LH) policy when the capacity advantage of supplier L is weaker than its cost advantage ( c H ) ), or diminishes (enhances) the significance of HL (LH) policy when the opposite is the case (
. This is because under centralized scheme, the unit regular sourcing cost of the manufacturer equals the unit regular production cost of the primary supplier, whereas under decentralized scheme, the unit regular sourcing cost of the manufacturer (i.e., unit wholesale price of the primary supplier) manly depends on the capacity of the primary supplier. Thus, when the capacity advantage of the low-cost supplier is weaker than its cost advantage, the manufacturer is more likely to choose LH policy under centralized scheme than decentralized scheme. When the capacity advantage of the low-cost supplier is stronger than its cost advantage, the manufacturer is more likely to choose LH policy under decentralized scheme than centralized scheme.
III. EXTENSION
In Section II, we analyze the sourcing strategy of the manufacturer who faces two suppliers with asymmetric capacities, reliabilities, and (regular) production costs. In this section, we extend our model to the case of asymmetric backup production costs for the two suppliers, which is not addressed in existing studies. Specifically, assume that the backup production cost of supplier i (i ∈ {L, H }) is c bi , and c bL < c bH = c b , i.e., the supplier with low regular production cost also has low backup production cost. Thus, Assumptions 1 and 2 should be rewritten as follows:
A. APROCUREMENT DECISIONS UNDER CENTRALIZED SCHEME
When i is primary supplier and j is backup supplier, by following the same argument of Subsection C, we obtain the optimal regular order quantity Q * ri = k i , the optimal backup order quantity Q * bj = (D − c bj − δ i k i )/2 and the optimal expected profit of the manufacturer
where the superscript ''ce'' labels the centralized scheme in the extension model. By comparing π ce LH with π ce HL , Proposition 5 is obtained.
Proposition 5: Under centralized decision making scheme, π ce LH < π ce HL when α L < λ 2 , and π ce LH ≥ π ce HL when α L ≥ λ 2 , where
.
According to Assumptions 3 and 4, we have 4c 
Proof: Since
Corollary 3 implies that compared with symmetric backup production costs, the asymmetric backup production costs cause the manufacturer either more (less) likely to choose LH (HL) policy when the market potential is small, or less (more) likely to choose LH (HL) policy when the market potential is large. This is because in the symmetric backup production costs situation, the cost advantage of supplier L only reflects in regular production. However, in the asymmetric backup production costs situation, the manufacturer can make use of the cost advantage of supplier L whether L is primary supplier (LH policy) or backup supplier (HL policy): when the market potential is large, the limited capacity of primary supplier highlights the role of backup sourcing, and the manufacturer is more likely to make use of the cost advantage of supplier L for backup sourcing; when the market potential is small, the role of backup sourcing is not so significant, and the manufacturer is more likely to make use of the cost advantage of supplier L for regular sourcing.
B. PROCUREMENT DECISIONS UNDER DECENTRALIZED SCHEME
When i is primary supplier and j is backup supplier, by following the same argument of Subsection D, we obtain the optimal wholesale price of the primary supplier w * ri = (5D + 3c bj − 11k i )/8, the optimal regular order quantity Q * ri = k i , the optimal wholesale price of the backup supplier w bj * = (D + c bj − δ i k i )/2, the optimal backup order quantity Q * bj = (D − c bj − δ i k i )/4 and the optimal expected profit of the manufacturer is
where the superscript ''de'' labels the decentralized decision making scheme in the extension model. By comparing π de LH with π de HL , Proposition 6 is obtained.
Clearly, Proposition 4 is a special case of Proposition 6, with c bH and c bL replaced by c b . The intuition behind Proposition 6 is similar to that of Proposition 4, and we do not explain here. Now we compare the difference of supplier arrangement decisions between base model and extension model under decentralized decision making scheme. For convenience, Proposition 4 can be rewritten as:
H /k 2 L with λ 3 , and the result is illustrated in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4 means that in the industry with scale economies (k L > k H ), compared with symmetric backup production costs, the asymmetric backup production costs induce the manufacturer more likely to choose HL policy. This is because in base model, the backup costs of the two suppliers are identical, whereas in extension model, supplier L has backup cost advantage (c bL < c bH ) and the manufacturer is more likely to choose L as backup supplier (note that the regular production cost advantage of L is inoperative under decentralized scheme whether in base or extension model).
In the industry without scale economies (k L ≤ k H ), Propositions 4 and 6 show that the optimal supplier arrangement decisions between base and extension models are identical: selecting HL policy (π d HL > π d LH and π de HL > π de LH ). However,
It implies that in the industry without scale economies, compared with symmetric backup production costs, asymmetric backup production costs amplify the advantage of HL policy. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In high-tech industry, firms frequently suffer from upstream supply risk and capacity constraint. This study investigates the procurement problem of a manufacturer who faces two suppliers with different costs, capacities, and reliabilities, where the low-cost supplier has low reliability. We derive the optimal unit wholesale prices for the primary supplier as well as backup supplier, the optimal regular order quantity and optimal backup order quantity for the manufacturer. Different from general wisdom which exogenously sets primary supplier and backup supplier, in this study, the supplier arrangement (i.e., selecting primary supplier and backup supplier) is regarded as endogenous decision for the manufacturer. There are two possible supplier arrangement policies, namely, LH policy (i.e., taking the low-cost supplier as the primary supplier and the high-cost supplier as the backup supplier) and HL policy (i.e., taking the high-cost supplier as the primary supplier and the low-cost supplier as the backup supplier).
Under centralized decision making scheme, we show that LH policy outperforms HL policy when the reliabilities between the two suppliers are close. When these reliabilities are not so close, HL policy outperforms LH policy. In addition, the manufacturer in the industry without scale economies is more likely to choose HL policy than that in the industry with scale economies because scale diseconomies endow the high-cost supplier with one more advantage, i.e., the capacity advantage. Under decentralized decision making scheme, we observe that in the industry without scale economies, the manufacturer selects HL policy. However, in the industry with scale economies, the manufacturer selects LH policy if the reliabilities of the two suppliers are close, otherwise he chooses HL policy. Compared with centralized scheme, decentralized scheme always enhances (diminishes) the significance of HL (LH) policy in the industry without scale economies, whereas in the industry with scale economies, decentralized scheme either enhances (diminishes) the significance of HL (LH) policy when the capacity advantage of the low-cost supplier is weak, or diminishes (enhances) the significance of HL (LH) policy when this advantage is strong. This is because the cost advantage of the low-cost supplier is active under centralized scheme but inoperative under decentralized scheme. Furthermore, our model is extended to a general case of asymmetric backup production costs. Under centralized scheme, compared with symmetric case, the asymmetric backup production costs cause the manufacturer more (less) likely to choose LH (HL) policy when the market potential is small, but less (more) likely to choose LH (HL) policy when the market potential is large. This is because in the extension case, the manufacturer has to determine to utilize the cost advantage of the low-cost supplier in regular sourcing (i.e., LH policy) or in backup sourcing (i.e., HL policy) depending on the market potential. Under decentralized scheme, compared with symmetric backup production costs, the asymmetric backup production costs always strengthen (weaken) the significance of HL (LH) policy. This is because decentralized scheme sterilizes the cost advantage of the lowcost supplier in regular sourcing; as a result, in the case of asymmetric backup production costs, the manufacturer is more likely to take the low-cost supplier as the backup supplier (i.e., HL policy) in order to make full use of its cost advantage.
There are some intriguing directions for future research. First, our dual sourcing model can be generalized to a case of multiple sourcing (i.e., multiple potential suppliers). In this case, which suppliers should be selected for regular production and which ones for backup sourcing are interesting research questions. Second, in our current model, the regular production cost and backup production cost of each supplier are common knowledge. But sometimes, high-tech manufacturers lack transparency of production costs of their suppliers [28] , thus, the current model can be extended to the case of private production costs. In this case, it is necessary for the high-tech manufacturer to design procurement mechanism at both regular sourcing stage and backup sourcing stage to reveal the private information of suppliers. Moreover, other future research directions include the non-linear production cost case and the random capacity situation.
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